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ABSTRACT
Since 1991 the international system has struggled and failed to recreate a state
on the territory of the former Somalia. Proto-state systems have been formed
by Somalis themselves in Somaliland and Puntland and alternative forms
of governance and order exist in other parts of Somalia, but none enjoys
international recognition. The polities of Somalia offer important lessons
concerning our general theories about social contract, the role that states
play in creating wealth, indigenous systems of governance, and the failure
of existing international approaches to state reconstruction. Contemporary
Somali politics is re-explored here to extract these lessons. The article ex-
plores the assumptions embedded in the works of the classic Western social
contract theorists in the light of Somali experience in order to show that the
underlying conceptual structure of international state reconstruction work
needs to be rethought. We conclude that it frequently is better to allow for
bottom-up, organic, disjointed negotiation of indigenous governance solu-
tions (even though they probably will not conform to Western ideas of liberal
democracy) than for the international system to impose top-down answers.
The former more closely tracks the history of state formation in Europe and
the latter is troubled by the inconsistent and not necessarily benign interests
of the international actors involved. Indigenous, local political systems are
changed by the stresses of violent conflict, so prompt action to employ them
in a post-conflict situation is indicated.
This article is partly based on research undertaken by the lead author in 2006 for the FAO
and IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative (see Leonard, 2006). Follow-up research in 2009 among
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INTRODUCTION
When Westerners think about collapsed states — be it Afghanistan, Congo,
Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia or Yugoslavia — Thomas Hobbes
is usually lurking in the background. This great seventeenth century En-
glish philosopher wrote in the midst of his country’s civil war and comes to
mind, first, because of his argument that without the state, there is war ‘of ev-
ery man against every man’, making life ‘nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes,
1939 [1651], Ch. 13: 159–62). But he is invoked as well because he saw the
legitimacy of the state as grounded in an unwritten social contract between
it and the governed. Thus those educated in Western philosophy and social
sciences assume both that the state is necessary to human welfare and that its
secure establishment requires some kind of social contract (Beichman, 2008;
Winter, 2004; for a related observation, see Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009:
45). These assumptions and attendant ones about how a social contract is
established implicitly guide most international efforts to deal with collapsed
states. Whether or not they are valid therefore is hugely important.
In this article the modern experience of the Somalis with states and social
contracts is examined in order to amend the assumptions the international
community brings to state reconstruction — not only in the Horn of Africa but
elsewhere.1 The facts presented will be familiar to specialists on the Somalis;
the article’s contribution instead lies in the lessons drawn from them. In the
same vein, philosophical work on the social contract goes well beyond
Hobbes, stretching from Ibn Khaldun in the fourteenth century (Mohamed,
2007: 239–43) though Kant at the time of the French Revolution (Kant,
1970) to John Rawls in the present (Rawls, 1971, 1999). The purpose here
is not to contribute to our understanding of these philosophers themselves.
Instead a revision is sought of the ways in which these social contract
theorists are used in response to present-day collapsed states. In this regard
the disagreements between Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, another
great social contract theorist, will be particularly highlighted (Rousseau,
1992 [1755], 2001 [1762]).
The ‘social contract’ is a thought experiment, whereby we ask when
people would agree to cede authority (i.e., the obligation to obey) to a
governing body in return for the social order and other benefits it might
provide. Ultimately, then, the ‘social contract’ is a tool for considering
what form of governance will be accepted as legitimate by a group of
people — with the consequence that it has moral authority over them and
will attract some degree of voluntary compliance beyond what coercion
or direct material inducement might provide. The classic social contract
1. The lead author did brief periods of fieldwork in the Mogadishu and Bay regions of Somalia
in 1980 and in Somaliland and Puntland in 2006 and those interviews are used in this article.
He does not speak Somali, however. Thus the article also relies on the insights of the co-
author, upon what Somali elites (in and out of the country) say about their society and upon
the remarkably rich literature produced by scholars who have dedicated their careers to
Somalia.
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theorists (Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant) did not posit that such an
agreement was an historical act (although the US Constitution subsequently
involved something very close to it). Rather, the ‘social contract’ as they
used it was simply a philosophical device. Nonetheless, as we have noted,
the different classical versions of the social contract are based on quite
clear assumptions about how humans behave, on what would lead them to
consider authority legitimate, and thus on the principles from which a stable
political order would need to be (re)constructed.
Hobbes is explicit in considering the state as the only form of governance
that can deliver an acceptable level of social order. Locke, Rousseau and
Kant implicitly assume the same (Dunn, 1984: 53, 55; Locke, 1967 [1689];
Scruton, 2001) and this assumption has been carried over into contemporary
efforts to rebuild ‘failed states’. However, late twentieth century political
anthropologists (also using the social contract as an heuristic device) demon-
strated that other forms of governance could achieve the same result under
certain conditions (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Lewis, 1999 [1961]).
Thus we must separate the concept of ‘governance’ from that of the ‘state’.
David Easton argued that it is most useful to conceive of a political system
‘as those institutions through which values are authoritatively allocated for
a society’ (Easton, 1965: 21). This then means that we are looking at a set
of rules or practices whereby a social group makes effective and morally
persuasive decisions about how conflicts over goods and behaviour are to be
resolved. These systems of governance might be states but the contemporary
reality of the Somalis alerts us to the fact that they also could be much
smaller than the colonial ‘states’ were and in addition could be based on
contractual agreements between kinship groups (xeer) or decisions of Islamic
courts applying sheria. This article seeks to explore the significance of these
non-state systems of governance, what their limitations may be, and their
implications for global attempts to create order for the Somalis as well as
for the international system itself.
We will demonstrate, as others already have, that social order and eco-
nomic growth can be delivered by non-state forms of governance. But we
will also indicate that some of these political alternatives may be more diffi-
cult to pursue the longer conflict has persisted and patronage has infiltrated
what had been more egalitarian and consensual kinship structures. Also,
alternative governance systems may be less effective than some states in
delivering certain forms of economic development and aspects of social
welfare. Nonetheless the fixation of the international community on state
governance has inhibited the development of other, more feasible, forms of
governance (which, even if imperfect, would be better than the collapsed
states). We will suggest that effective governance is more likely to emerge
in Somali-like conditions if it is built from the bottom up in irregular forms
and with imperfect coverage, rather than imposed from above. These forms
of local ‘social contract’ will be rooted in collectivities, rather than be-
ing pacts among individuals (as the classic contract theorists posited). And,
even when they are broadly egalitarian and participatory, they are likely to be
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resistant to a ‘liberal’ form of democracy, which assumes individual (rather
than group) rights.
We also conclude that for the Somalis Islamic sheria courts offer the most
likely prospect for territory-wide governance. Furthermore, we will suggest
that one way for the international community to escape the conceptual trap
into which its fixation with the state has thrown it is for the Transitional
Federal Government to cease being a contestant for political power and
instead be restructured as a non-residential trust through which aid and
loans can be passed to effective Somali governance units of any size and
composition.
THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE FORMER SOMALI
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
At least six contiguous political entities are dominated by citizens of So-
mali ethnicity: the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG),
Puntland (which nominally acknowledges the TFG but effectively sets its
own policies), Somaliland (whose claim of sovereignty has not been rec-
ognized internationally), Djibouti (which includes people of Afar as well
as Somali ethnicity), Region V of Ethiopia (the ‘Somali National Regional
State’), and the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. In addition, Islamist move-
ments (successors of the Union of Islamic Courts, which was overthrown
by Ethiopia on behalf of the TFG in 2007) have regained control of much
of southern and central Somalia (Gettleman, 2010; Hagmann and Hoehne,
2007). Since Somali herders and traders move constantly across the bound-
aries of these entities, there is significant economic and social continuity
across them. This article will focus on the political economy of the sys-
tems that occupied in 2010 the territory of the former Democratic Republic
of Somalia2 but will place that analysis in the context of the larger set of
authorities and social practices that govern the Somali people.
Somalia has not met the standard textbook definition of statehood since
President Siad Barre fled the country in 1991 (Montclos, 2001). Max
Weber famously defined the state as an organization that is able to exercise
a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial bound-
aries (1947: 156) and over the last twenty years no claimant to the mantle
of succession of the Democratic Republic of Somalia has met those criteria.
Instead the territory has been dominated by fragmentation and conflict. The
larger part of the country has been controlled by clan-affiliated warlords and
their privately financed militias, who were backed by individual big busi-
nessmen, and fought one another for control of the places from which they
could extract ‘economic rents’ (Bradbury, 2008: 70; Lewis, 2002).
2. The internationally-recognized designations are: the Somali Republic (1960–1969), the
Somali Democratic Republic (1969–1991) and now the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia.
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Somaliland is in the northwest of what was Somalia and declared itself
independent in 1991 (WSP International, 2005: 14). It has the organizational
structure of a state in Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed and Togdheer Regions but is
still contesting sovereignty over Sool and Sanaag3 in its east with Puntland
and as yet has not been able to conduct elections there (WSP International,
2004: 22; also Interviews, 2006: 39, 964). In fact, armed conflict over this
contested territory has broken out again since late 2007 (Hagmann, 2007).
Puntland is in the northeast and established a weak state structure in 1998
(WSP International, 2001: 11). It has reasonable command of Bari and
Nugaal Regions but in late 2006 was fighting the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC) to retain control of Galkayo and the territory to its south in Mudug.
Today the latter control is challenged by pirates who are using it as a base.
In 2006 the UIC controlled Mogadishu and had expanded its control to the
coastal southern areas of the country, but it had yet to create an organizational
apparatus for state functions beyond its military and the Islamic courts. After
an interim period of Ethiopian occupation from 2007, competing Islamic
groups (al Shabab and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa) once again control most of
the south and centre but have only partially developed governance structures.
(A third Islamist group, Hizb al Islam, merged with al Shabab in December
2010 [Associated Press, 2010b].)
The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed out of nego-
tiations in Kenya in 2004 (WSP International, 2004: 2) and on its behalf
Ethiopia reversed the advances of the UIC in January 2007. Nominally the
TFG holds the allegiance of all of former Somalia, save Somaliland. In
practice it is largely a group of former warlords and their delegates sitting
as ministers, with a moderate Islamist from the now-fractured UIC as its
president (Sheik Sherif Sheik Ahmed). In late 2006, it controlled only the
territory around Baidoa (Baydhabo, Bay Region), and Puntland was backing
it. It has formal authority over all the south but Islamist forces and others suc-
cessfully contest its writ, particularly in Kismaayo and most of Mogadishu
(Muqdisho) (OCHA, 2007). Since this contest is militarily active it is subject
to constant change of detail, but the broad picture of TFG weakness remains.
It is unlikely that the particular victor in the grand geopolitical contest
over sovereignty in the former Somalia matters very much for the welfare of
most Somalis. Obviously peace would be hugely positive and in that sense it
matters whether or not a final, stable outcome is reached. As and when secure
state structures emerge to govern the Somalis, the transaction costs and risks
of engaging in livestock and other forms of trade, which is fundamental to
Somali incomes, will diminish quite significantly (Interviews, 2006: 5, 13,
20, 33). Roads, health and education services also are likely to improve, and
3. Administrative divisions of Somalia before the civil war began in 1991. See <http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Somalia>.
4. Confidential interviews conducted by lead author.
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investment in fixed capital assets will be more viable. All the contending
entities offer such peace benefits, however.
Furthermore, most of the territories occupied by Somalis are arid or semi-
arid. Only in the area between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers in the south of
Somalia is there a substantial amount of sedentary agriculture. The Somali
livestock production system is overwhelmingly transhumant, with pastoral-
ists moving their stock to access seasonal pastures and water points. Because
the nature of these resources varies from year to year, as does the need for
them, and because they are left unoccupied for substantial periods between
uses, conflicts over access to them can be common and sometimes deadly.
While a herder is away, lands he is accustomed to using could be occupied by
other herders or farmers and in a bad year it may be a matter of life or death
whether or not he is able to reclaim them (Devereux, 2006: 11, 15, 106–10;
Hagmann, 2007: 40).5 When it comes to stopping violent conflict over water
and grazing on the savannah, none of the contenders for power are likely
to be able to deliver dramatic changes, however, for neither the colonial
powers in the past nor Kenya in the present (whose ‘stateness’ is unques-
tioned) established an effective monopoly of force in the pastoral hinterland
(Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009: 47–52; Menkhaus, 2006: 87). The Soma-
lis have developed non-state structures for governing their relationships in
the pastoral pasturelands and we will see that these have been reasonably
successful.
HOW IS ‘EVERYDAY ORDER’ CREATED IN ‘CHAOS’?
It is an error to conclude that just because the state of Somalia is no longer
functioning and because there are warlords and various types of factions in
control of much of its territory, that anarchy therefore reigns. In industrialized
states there are very few governance institutions between the individual and
the state, so that for them the collapse of the state really does threaten
anarchy. But in Somalia the reach of the state was never complete and
governance institutions that pre-existed it have continued to persist or have
been resurrected in the years since 1991. These ‘traditional’ institutions have
been stressed and changed by the persistence of violent conflict in much of
the territory the Somali people occupy (Samatar, 1992). But they continue
to impart a powerful frame for human behaviour and re-emerged after 1991
to provide order to most rural Somalis (Hagmann, 2005: 529).
Even in fragile states surprising levels of local potential for constructive
governance survive conflict (Manor, 2007: 3–15). Local institutions may
be damaged by conflict but they do better than national ones. As Kant
5. Devereux’s research was conducted in the Somali Region of Ethiopia, but as these herders
also graze their stock in Somalia proper and trade through its ports, the observation applies
more generally.
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emphasized, no new state entity ever creates its governing institutions from
a tabula rasa (Scruton, 2001: 115); it must instead respond not only to
patterns of individual interests but also to persisting structures of non-state
governance as well. Peasant societies more generally have usually fought to
provide their own, local systems of civil and social order and to maintain their
autonomy from the over-arching authority of states. Until the late eighteenth
century village communities in Europe provided their own social and civil
order locally (Magagna, 1991).
Peasant communities do suffer when their countries descend into civil
war — but it is not from the breakdown of order locally but from the warring
and predation of state claimants over the top of them. Generally these peasant
communities would like most simply to be left alone. Certainly this has been
the experience of most rural Somalis before and after the collapse of the
state in 1991 (Hagmann, 2007; Little, 2003: 153, 168; Menkhaus, 2006: 22).
Thus if we are to understand the political economy of the present and future
political entities of the Somalis, these persistent, local structures must be
presented, analysed and weighed.
The Basis of Sociability
Hobbes assumed that the universal (cross-cultural) and primary (coming
before all others) motive of human beings is personal survival. However,
this fundamental assumption of his analysis was not empirically rooted, but
derived and modified from the philosophic work of Grotius (Tuck, 1989:
68–74). Rousseau challenged the Hobbesian axiom by insisting that it was
too individualistic (O’Hagen, 1999: 101; Wokler, 2001: 54, 56, 74). In this
Rousseau followed Aristotle, as did Ibn Khaldun before him (Mohamed,
2007: 242), asserting that sociability is fundamental to humanity as well,
that the generation of wealth requires collective, not just individual activity,
and that humans have a natural propensity for empathy toward others when
it doesn’t conflict with their direct self-interest.
Evans-Pritchard’s monograph on the Nuer provided the first colonial-
era data on behaviour in a stateless society. Contrary to the Hobbesian
expectation he did not find a ‘war of all against all’. This classic piece of
social anthropology concludes that pervasive inter-group conflict among the
Nuer is avoided through the negotiating prowess and religious authority of
the (non-state) ‘leopard skin chiefs’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Robert Bates
has provided a reinterpretation of the Evans-Pritchard data and asserts that
order instead is provided by the mutual deterrence of ‘tit-for-tat’ retaliatory
behaviour by kinship groups (Bates, 1983: Ch. 1: 7–20).
We also have the observations in I.M. Lewis’s classic A Pastoral Democ-
racy (Lewis, 1999 [1961]: 6, 28, 163, 168–70, 228–32) on statelessness
among the Somalis in colonial British Somaliland. Lewis’s research doesn’t
fit either Hobbes or Rousseau perfectly — the state probably does protect
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urban dwellers from violence better than do other forms of political organi-
zation, but neither colonial nor contemporary states in the Greater Horn of
Africa have done an adequate job of protecting pastoralists in the savannah
(see also Menkhaus, 2006: 89). In the absence of effective security from
states, Somalis have not engaged in a ‘war of all against all’ but instead
have sought protection through kinship groups. Lewis’s findings are less op-
timistic than those of Evans-Pritchard (even though he was taught by him),
nor do they confirm Bates’ thesis about the universal efficacy of tit-for-tat
retaliation as a solution to inter-group conflict. According to Lewis the pay-
ment of ‘blood money’ by Somali dia-paying [mag] groups may prevent the
escalation of conflict when that is what most of a segmentary lineage wants
instead of revenge. But it doesn’t stop either the existence of considerable
inter-personal violence in the system nor the callous disregard by dominant
lineages of ‘blood money’ demands from weaker ones.
Rousseau’s assertion of the fundamental sociability of humanity is more
useful, at least in Africa, than the ‘methodological individualism’ of Hobbes.
In the absence of the state and civil order people do not seek to maximize their
personal chances of survival or of individual wealth. Childless young men,
who should be the most self-interested, are the least cautious about their own
lives and seem to be highly oriented toward their immediate social groups
in their fighting and material accumulation strategies. Military sociologists
have long told us that soldiers generally do not risk their lives for God (an
abstract ideology), country (another social abstraction) or glory, but out of
solidarity with, and to maintain the respect of, their peers in their immediate
fighting units (Janowitz, 1960). Similarly sociologists and anthropologists
studying Africa tell us that people seek wealth, at least in the first instance,
in order to meet the social obligations to their kin that they accumulated
while growing up and that they subsequently use it to purchase status in
their communities (Berry, 1993; Marie, 1997: 416).
Thus wealth is not particularly valuable in its own right but instead is
an instrument for extending, consolidating and gaining status within one’s
social network. And survival, which certainly is highly valued, will often be
put at risk for the sake of this same network. Indeed, as Elias has observed,
in most of the developing world and certainly in Africa, the kinship group
and locality are not in conflict with personal survival but are seen as the
basic units through which it is achieved (Marie, 1997: 415).
The question, then, is not whether humans are primarily social animals,
but what is the fundamental character of the social network to which they
owe their allegiance. The general evidence tends toward ‘social construc-
tion’ of identity, but under conditions of great stress, when survival is most
threatened, the metaphor (although most often not the strict substance) of
kinship is operative.
The large literature on race and ethnicity, not to speak of nationality,
demonstrates that these superficially kinship-based claims to identity are
as much or more cultural than biological constructs (Fearon and Laitin,
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2000; Leonard and Straus, 2003: Ch. 1: 1–20). In southern Somalia the
structures of intra- and inter-clan governance had been seriously eroded
by Italian colonialism (less so by the British in the north-west) (Besteman,
1999; Huliaras, 2002: 158). Clans seemed to survive largely as ‘socially
constructed’ identities — real in their social consequences but for a great
many Somalis in the south of the country of more limited significance and
not expressing the realities of descent. Nonetheless when the Somali state
collapsed and people were threatened with lives that were ‘nasty, brutish
and short’ (as Hobbes would have it) the segmentary lineage system of clan
governance re-emerged throughout the country as one of the fundamental
organizing principles for attempts at civil order.
The preceding statement of Somali reversion under great stress to kinship
must be qualified. First, even a segmentary lineage system (one which builds
units of loyalty outward from the nuclear family on the basis of degree of
biological relationship) is socially constructed in Somalia, for it is based on
only patrilineal descent. Since Africa also has matrilineal descent systems
(e.g., in southern Ghana and Malawi) it is clear that this way of defining
and qualifying lineage is a product of culture. The family as a motivating
force thus seems to be more of a metaphor (Lakoff, 2002) and a socially
constructed ideology for motivating behaviour, with a powerful but only
loose association with the instinct to protect one’s kin. In this way, although
rooted in the concept of kinship, ‘clan’ has been flexible enough to change
over time and in response to circumstance. For example, Bernhard Helander
asserts that a majority of the Hubeer clan in the inter-riverine area of southern
Somalia probably are members by adoption, not descent, but that this does
not alter their adherence to the clan (Besteman, 1996: 50–51).6
The Somali segmentary lineage system is based on various breaks in the
line of male descent. Its advantage over ‘neighbourhood’ for a transhumant
pastoral system is that identity is defined by kinship and not locality, so that
membership is clear even when different groups are present in the same area
(Battera, 1998: 189). Some Somalis are said to be able to trace their patrilineal
line for up to thirty generations. The broadest lineage grouping is the clan
family, which has symbolic and political significance but no organization.
One progresses to ever-smaller groupings — the clan, the sub-clan, the sub-
sub-clan and finally the dia-paying group (which typically counts around
100 adult male members). The last is the unit that handles claims for and
payment of compensation for injuries. I.M Lewis provides the classic and
authoritative description of the social functioning of these lineage groups
among the Somali and there is no need to reproduce his account here (Lewis,
1999 [1961]).7
6. See also: Besteman (1999: 17, 20–23); Gundel and Dharbaxo (2006: 48, 51); Hagmann
(2005: 532); Höhne (2007); Little (2003); Samatar (1992).
7. See also Hagmann (2005: 532; 2007); Höhne (2006, 2007); Luling (2006: 471); Mohamed
(2007: 226).
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Clan Governance
There is frequent reference to the ‘clan elders’ in Somali politics but the
meaning of the term varies by level (Hagmann, 2007: 33–4). At the dia-
paying rung it simply denotes the collection of adult male members. At
clan level it designates an ugas, ‘sultan’, beeldaajie (in Puntland) or other
hereditary, more or less honorary leader, who rarely plays a political role.
In between are people, such as a nabadoon in the south or still lower a
samadoon (in Puntland), selected by the community to negotiate peace be-
tween lineage groups, to administer customary law (xeer),8 or to preside over
the assembly of elders. Those chosen to represent the lineage in some kind
of representative function generally will be designated simply as ‘elders’,
even though that is also the title of those for whom they speak. Such rep-
resentative elders need not reside in the community proper and might even
be self-made businessmen or from the international diaspora. Also these
roles are facilitative rather than authoritative. Unless the holder’s standing
has been eroded by too partisan an involvement in politics, these positions
usually have enough influence to secure the acceptance of judgements. But
this is due to persuasion and legitimacy, not control of force (Bradbury,
2008: 16–17; Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006; Mohamed, 2007: 227–30; also,
Interviews, 2006: 76).
A system of governance organized around segmentary lineage provides
a social structure for negotiating relationships and social contracts (xeer)
within and between groups, although it has its limits (Brons, 2001: 120;
Farah and Lewis, 1997: 353; WSP International, 2005: 51). It can give rela-
tionships regularity and reduce violence by creating structures of deterrence.
Commerce does extraordinarily well, using the clan system and Islamic
sheria courts with agility to build trust and enforceable contracts, even
across clans (Bradbury, 2008: 245; Hagmann, 2005: 528; Little, 2003: 8–9,
124; also, Interviews, 2006: 33, 51).
The dia-paying [mag] group is the most important operational unit. It pro-
vides collective insurance against torts, for it makes payments for violent
deaths, injuries, etc. If payments are not made or accepted, then vengeance
will be taken against any member of the offender’s dia-paying group. Al-
though Somalis are conscious of and frequently heavily influenced by kinship
ties beyond the dia-paying group those obligations are much more flexible.
So social control is exercised only within the primary group and contract
(xeer) enforced by tit-for-tat and Islamic oath provides for order between
them. If the dia-paying group becomes engulfed with internal conflict or too
big to be manageable it is likely to sub-divide along more primary kinship
lines (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006; LeSage, 2005; Little, 2003: 12).
First in Somaliland and then in Puntland, the end of civil war and the
creation of new constitutions were negotiated through clans (or more usually,
8. For a detailed discussion of this important institution, see Mohammed (2007).
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sub-clans). The clan elders in the sense of representatives and conciliators
(the guurti) are responsible for the success of Somaliland today. They sold
the idea of disarmament to the clans and negotiated the representation of
other clans. They played a similar but lesser role in Puntland, where clan
negotiations took place under the dominance of a single, Ethiopian-supported
warlord (Battera, 1998: 179; International Crisis Group, 2009: 4; Höhne,
2009). In circumstances in which it was very difficult and divisive to hold
elections, legislative representatives in both authorities were designated in
clan proceedings. The dominant lower house in Somaliland moved on in
2005 to representatives elected directly by the citizenry but in Puntland clan
representation is still used (Bradbury, 2008; Bradbury et al., 2003; Doornbos,
2002; Hansen and Bradbury, 2007; Samantar, 2009; also, Interviews, 2006:
52, 77–8, 95).
Note that the social contracts negotiated in the guurti by the clans in
the northern Somali polities are different from the ones hypothesized by
Hobbes and Locke. They established contracts among groups, not individuals
(Bradbury, 2010), and thus differ from the philosophical foundations of the
western liberal state (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006: iii; Lucy, 2007: 20). They
do come closer to Rousseau’s general will, in that they emerged from a
collective consensus. Even there, the parallel is imperfect, however, for the
sense of being a group precedes rather than follows the formation of the social
contract. This feature that order and the social contract are created by kinship
or locality groups is shared by the Nuer (Bates, 1983; Evans-Pritchard, 1940)
and may be general to stateless societies, at least in metaphorical form. It also
characterizes the base, rural, local level in most African states (Mamdani,
1996).9 It is very different from the Western liberal democratic foundation
on votes by autonomous individuals.
Nonetheless, despite their importance, the clans are weak at imposing
order, especially on those who are willing to ignore or abuse the system. Clan
governance is weaker in urban areas and seems attenuated among the more
fundamentalist Islamists (International Crisis Group, 2010; Marchal, 2009).
Where it is used among the Somali, however, all adult males participate in
the base level of clan deliberations and decisions are made by consensus.
Even where the clan structures are strong, as in the north, north-east and
Belet Weyne, it is difficult to impose burdens for the collective good that do
not command nearly universal consent (Oker and Habibullah, 2010). And,
of course, clan governance is a weak instrument for dealing with supra-clan
problems.
Especially in the south, as the political significance of clan institutions has
become clear, they have been penetrated by the patronage of warlords and
big businessmen, thus harming their integrity and effectiveness, particularly
on issues beyond the local level (Menkhaus, 2009). Thus the authority of
southern clan elders has been eroded by their being co-opted into partisan
9. Corroborated by multiple field observations throughout Africa by the authors since 1963.
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political combat (Bakonyi and Stuvoy, 2005; Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006;
Lewis, 2004; LeSage, 2001; Little, 2003; Samatar, 1992; also, Interviews,
2006: 45, 78). Many believe that the clans were manipulated and bought
in the creation of the TFG, compromising its legitimacy. On the southern
coast clans have been able to develop governance systems for smaller towns
and rural areas but they were able to do no more than create truces between
warlords in places where major ‘rents’ could be collected and have shown
limited ability to resist either the warlords or the Islamists when attacked
(Gettleman, 2010).
In the north and north-east legislative representatives had been nominated
from the sub-sub clan, and then selected at a more contested, higher, senior
elder level. This is still true for Puntland and the TFG. In Somaliland the
selection of legislative representatives has moved from sub-clan consensus
to citizen secret ballot, and in doing so the coherence of the lineages has
weakened (Terlinden, 2009). Individuals from different parties represent the
same clan in the elected lower house in Somaliland. Although there cer-
tainly is an element of clan underlying political allegiances, the parties in
the legislature are mixed by clan, demonstrating that the clans as bodies of
collective decision making on matters of national politics now have some-
what diminished significance (Abokor et al., 2006: 9–21; Menkhaus, 2009;
also, Interviews, 2006: 52–3, 77–8, 98). From this we can conclude that clan
elders can be highly effective at conciliation and at representation on issues
that are not internally divisive (Bradbury, 2010), but that the effectiveness
of the institution breaks down if it is used for partisan competition or to
impose (rather than negotiate) settlements. Clan elders can help to negotiate
consensus on issues of common interest but they don’t act by majority rule
and they can’t impose a decision on an organized group.
THE GENERATION OF WEALTH
Hobbes felt that the state is a prerequisite to the creation of property and
wealth (Hobbes, 1939 [1651]: Ch. 13: 159–62). Locke felt that at least mon-
etary exchange is not dependent on the state (Dunn, 1984: 46) and Rousseau
hypothesized instead that states were formed in order to protect wealth and
inequality (Wokler, 2001: 51). Although most social theory has sided with
Hobbes in seeing civil order as a prerequisite to capitalist growth (North,
1990), the experience of the Somalis has been closer to Rousseau’s expec-
tation. The state under Siad Barre was extraordinarily predatory (Besteman
and Cassanelli, 1996), a possibility that Locke emphasized (Dunn, 1984:
52–60). When the Barre state collapsed Somali businessmen exploded into
prodigous income-seeking efforts. The general populace has been impover-
ished in the major urban areas by the conflicts of the warlords, but certain
types of businessmen have prospered from the removal of state controls on
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their endeavours (Bradbury, 2008: 245; Hagmann, 2005: 528; Little, 2003:
8–9, 124, 152).
Of course, the extreme laissez-faire environment of Somalia makes some
forms of capitalist expansion easy at the expense of others. Those who have
done best are those who engage in various forms of export and import trade,
turning the whole country into a kind of duty-free port. Business growth
also may have been facilitated by the ability to ‘park’ capital in other, secure
states, but seems to have reached its limits now. (Parking was achieved
literally by Dallo Airlines, a successful, Somali-owned, private enterprise,
which kept its aircraft overnight on the Saudi peninsula.)
Although Somali trade did extremely well when freed from the ‘economic
repression’ of Barre, it seems now to have reached the limits of what pure
laissez-faire can deliver (even if laissez-faire also includes the unregulated
purchase of warlord power). Investments in fixed assets and production in
Somalia proper are less common (save for mobile phone towers) (Menkhaus,
2006: 82; Pham, 2009; Webersik, 2006). Even in the export livestock trade,
the sanitary standards demanded by the Gulf states required collective ac-
tion among traders which they were unable to deliver in the absence of more
effective states (Interview, 2006: 32). Even the proto-state political systems
of Puntland and Somaliland had a difficult time enforcing regulations on
this group. The strongest pressures on them to do so came from the compe-
tition of another Somali system — Djibouti — which developed a livestock
inspection system cooperatively with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (with
its vastly profitable market for goats for the haj) (Brass, 2007). It almost
certainly was this competition which led to the acceptance in Somaliland
and Puntland of Saudi veterinary inspection at their ports. In the end the
Saudis themselves have taken on the function of veterinary inspection at the
Somali ports of livestock shipments to their country.
Despite these qualifiers about economic growth post-Barre, however, any
simple assumption that statelessness is ‘bad for business’ cannot be sustained
from the Somali evidence (Little, 2003).
Patronage
Freed from the regulatory and predatory repression of the Barre regime,
Somali business has undergone explosive growth, so that Somalis are the
dominant traders in the region and control major finance and transport sys-
tems as well. Far from being at the mercy of the warlords in the disintegrated
Somali state, traders have frequently emerged as their patrons (Bradbury,
2008). If the states in Somalia are an outgrowth of ‘organized crime’ (Tilly,
1992), it is the big businessmen who are financing the predatory efforts of
the warlords. Both may be preying on society but we don’t see warlords
being terribly effective in taking advantage of rich traders. Politics within
the Somali political systems is heavily influenced by those individuals who
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are able to use their resources to purchase protection, personal consideration,
elected offices and policy attention. Their hand could be seen in the debates
about the new Veterinary Code in Somaliland and they control the port of
Bosasso (Boosasso) in Puntland (Interviews, 2006: 50, 57, 87). On the other
hand, traders are not a unified block — they compete intensely with each
other, and as international markets shift and reward different sets of personal
connections, new traders become dominant. This is seen most dramatically
in the reversals in fortune between livestock traders with the shifts in access
to the Saudi market (Interviews, 2006: 85).
Extreme inequalities in wealth pose large challenges to the ability of
extended family/community systems to define and defend their ‘general
will’, as expressed through the consensus of the assembly of adult males.
Of course, inequality is a basic feature of pastoral societies, but this wealth
is expressed in cattle, the holdings of which vary considerably over an
individual’s lifetime. The current patterns of inequality are not rooted in
livestock production and are much greater. They can stimulate predation —
not on the rich, who can hire others to defend their wealth, but on the ability of
people at the bottom to identify and pursue their common interests, distorted
as they come to be by patron–client relations (Besteman and Cassanelli,
1996).
The wealthy can provide jobs (including as militia), handouts and discrete
benefits to individuals or small groups, thereby using patronage to command
their support and leading them to sacrifice their collective interests (such as
higher prices or peace) for the sake of (ultimately less valuable) personal ones
(Bates, 1981; Leonard, 2006, 2010; Migdal, 1974). Thus the political actions
of this trader group and of the Somali diaspora politicians are well described
by a patron–client model of politics. Once established, this patronage can
and does weaken clan unity (Bradbury, 2008: 206–9; Gundel and Dharbaxo,
2006: 17; Pham, 2009; Terlinden, 2009).
Of course the longer a conflict persists, the more likely it is that the busi-
nesses that are damaged by it will fail and will no longer have the resources
to press their interests very effectively. The corollary is that businesses that
do well in a conflict environment will grow in strength and, the longer such
an environment persists, will be likely to exert an influence that makes the
resolution of the conflict more difficult.
ISLAM
With the inability of the clans to bring peace to the south of Somalia, we saw
in 2006 the emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which made a
very powerful ideological claim on society. The UIC had the ability to impose
greater order than any secular social structure seemed able to create and was
easily the most important instance of state-creation in the centre and south
of the country since the fall of Barre. A commonplace among sociologists of
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religion (confirmed by our field observations in several instances in Africa)
is that when death seems to become random and without regular cause,
people have a strong need for spiritual beliefs and practices that will explain
the inexplicable and give them some psychological tools for controlling the
uncontrollable. Thus religious systems of order may be a natural part of
the deep structure whereby people seek to bring environments of extreme
danger under control and to create extra incentives for sociable behaviour.
Religion and other ideologies serve to reinforce social behaviour that
considers entities beyond the extended family. The nature and boundaries
of that social behaviour are defined by the particular, socially constructed
ideology used. The incentives generated by these ideologies may be less
powerful than those of the extended family but are strong enough that they
must be considered in models of human behaviour. Among the Somalis,
kinship is the first and foremost focus of socialization, but Islam comes
close behind and has the virtue, at least as much as language does, of being
a historically unifying and nationalist force for them.
With the weakening if not disintegration of state courts in most parts of the
former Republic, Somalis have turned to sheria ones, as they always did for
family law matters in any case. Together with the clans, these religious courts
have provided an important element of order and through the enforcement
of contracts have facilitated business, not only within the former Somalia
but throughout the Muslim world. A Muslim oath can be adjudicated in any
Islamic court and a good Muslim would neither break his/her oath nor refuse
the order of such a court, even though it lacked any enforcement power
other than moral suasion. Thus a Muslim doing business with Somalis will
have much greater trust in a transaction if his/her counterpart appears to be
a devout Muslim. Religion is good for business among the Somalis and vice
versa (Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006; LeSage, 2001, 2006). Business finance
for Somalia’s various Islamic court initiatives provides strong confirming
evidence (Marchal, 2009: 385–86).
It is plausible that the emergence of Islam as a major factor in Somali
regime politics is a direct consequence of the transformation of internal clan
governance during twenty years of conflict. The clan councils (shirs and
guurti)10 are no longer egalitarian structures but instead now are frequently
instruments of the particular interests of patrons. The warlords and major
patrons ‘representing’ them in negotiated structures like the Transitional
Federal Government are largely motivated only by offers to advance their
own interests, which leaves governance without the stability and staying
power that an endorsement by an egalitarian clan structure would have
provided. Islam enters as the only other force in Somali society that can
cause warlords and patrons to honour their commitments, look to the long
run, and serve some kind of ‘general interest’.
10. Shir stands for any meeting (of elders and others), while guurti is the highest level council
of elders.
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Islamic courts therefore were a natural rallying force as disdain for the
warlords and disappointment at the stalled progress of the TFG grew in
2006. What made the UIC controversial (even in Somaliland and Puntland,
where it never prevailed) was not sheria itself but the questions of which
interpretation of sheria would be used (WSP International, 2001: 68; 2004: 7)
and who would control the adjudication. Sheria courts are the primary forum
for justice in all the Somali polities, even in the TFG after the Ethiopians
reversed the Islamist UIC.
Since the departure of the Ethiopians and the agreement made in Djibouti
to install one of the moderate leaders of the UIC, Sheik Sherif Sheik Ahmed,
as president of the TFG, the remaining Islamist movement has split. The
most radical group is al Shabab, much of whose finances are thought to
come from Wahabi fundamentalists and an important minority of whose
members hip is allied with al-Qaeda. Hizb al Islam was less extreme and
more willing to compromise with clan politics. But in late 2010 it merged
with al Shabab after losing local battles to it. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa is
the most moderate Islamist movement; it is congenial to Somalia’s sufi
orders and often supports Sheik Sherif in the TFG (Associated Press, 2010b;
International Crisis Group, 2010; Marchal, 2009). Somalis, particularly rural
ones, are largely Sufis, a form of Islam held in disdain by the fundamentalist
Wahabis. The question of whether the sheria courts run even by al Shabad
could remain fundamentalist or would become more traditional and tolerant
therefore has seemed open to many observers. In addition, al Shabab is led
by members of the Hawiye clan family and so far has been successful in
gaining control only of territories in which that clan is predominant. Now
that clan politics (quite probably with Western encouragement) have merged
with Islamist politics the ability of any of the contending movements to gain
control of the whole country may be more doubtful. It is nonetheless true that
Islam offers a greater prospect of generating cross-clan identities among the
Somalis than nationalism or democracy. Stability for the south and centre
of Somalia under a unified moderate Islamism seemed possible to many
observers in 2006. Obviously the TFG and its Ethiopian and American allies
instead became persuaded that the fundamentalists and those allied with
al-Qaeda were predominant, leading them to unite in a military operation
to overthrow the UIC. This decision threw Mogadishu (and occasionally
Kismayu) into civil war again (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Marchal, 2004,
2007a, 2007b; Menkhaus, 2007).
As the military supporters of the TFG — Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the
US — are all predominately Christian, they were unlikely to prevail against a
resurgent Somali Islamic nationalism; and they did not (International Crisis
Group, 2010; Marchal, 2009). In 2009 the TFG and its allies surrendered
to reality and through a conference in Djibouti did what many observers
thought they could have done more advantageously in 2006 — turned to the
leadership of the moderate wing of the UIC in the person of President Sheik
Sherif Sheik Ahmed (Marchal, 2007b; Pham, 2009). So far the radical wing
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of the old UIC, led by al Qaeda-allied al Shabab, has been able to keep the
TFG on the defensive — although it has been unable to establish suzerainty
(Gettleman, 2009). The civil war continues, but with the initiative lying
with the Islamist factions and the TFG holding onto only a small piece of
real estate with African Union support. Some form of Islamism (hopefully
a more moderate one) seems to us to offer the only prospect of peace and
stability in most of the south and centre of the country. (Somaliland and
Puntland are viable, as they are as separate entities.)
THE ROLE OF OTHER STATES IN INHIBITING LOCAL
SOCIAL CONTRACTS
Since the Democratic Republic of Somalia collapsed in 1991, the interna-
tional community has been struggling to recreate a state in its territory. Twice
this involved the presence of significant foreign troops on Somali soil —
first from 1993–5 by the UN with US leadership and second in 2007 and
2008 by the African Union, spearheaded by Ethiopia and implicitly backed
by the US. For a period, the UN attempted to establish district-based po-
litical authorities in the country, hoping to be able to assemble them into
a national confederation, but failed because of inadequate involvement of
clan elders (Menkhaus, 2009: 37). Djibouti later attempted to broker the
creation of a Transitional National Government. This was followed in 2004
by a prolonged conference in Kenya, at which considerable international
effort produced the formation of the Transitional Federal Government. And
another Djibouti conference in 2009 led to the appointment of an Islamic
moderate as TFG president. None of these efforts has ever resulted in effec-
tive control of more than a portion of Somali territory or anything that meets
the Weberian definition of empirical statehood.
The rhetoric surrounding international efforts to recreate the state of So-
malia consistently concerned the well-being of Somalis and the need to
re-establish order in order to assure it. However, other, less benign inter-
national motives have been evident as well for at least the last decade. As
noted above, the population of Ethiopia’s Region V (the Ogaden) is Somali,
and Siad Barre led Somalia into an irredentist war in 1977–8 in an attempt
to incorporate it. Ethiopia is determined that this not happen again, which
led to its support for Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in the creation of Puntland,
subsequently for his election as president of the TFG, and then for the in-
vasion of the country in 2007. Eritrea, which fought a bloody and poorly
resolved war with Ethiopia, supports Islamist rebels in Somalia as a way to
counter Ethiopian hegemony. Kenya too has a significant Somali population
and suppressed its irredentism in its first decade of independence. Its con-
cern to protect itself from Somali incursions was manifested most recently
when it denied the TFG (which it otherwise supports) the right to deploy to
Mogadishu ostensible TFG troops Kenya has helped to train (Associated
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Press, 2010a). The actions concerning Somalia by the United States, which
focuses its military activities in Africa only on terrorism and drugs, are driven
by the presence of an al Qaeda associate (Bagayoko-Penone, 2003). And the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been concerned with establishing a veterinary
inspection system for livestock exports from which its traders can benefit.
Many of these bilateral interests are quite legitimate, but even those that are
not remain real factors shaping attempts to recreate political authority in the
former Somalia. These strong, external national agendas are being imposed
on a set of Somali polities that have a very weak ability to define and defend
their own interests (International Crisis Group, 2010; Marchal, 2009).
At the multinational level, the African Union’s stance on Somalia is driven
by the strong commitment of African states to the inviolability of the conti-
nent’s ex-colonial borders, hence denying recognition to Somaliland (which,
with Djibouti, is the most state-like of any of the Somali political entities).
Further, the international system created after World War II is based on
the assumption that all the world’s territories can be dealt with through
diplomatically-recognized states. The UN system and the World Bank need
a ‘post box’ for Somalia to legalize their efforts to provide humane assis-
tance to its residents. And finally, there is the problem of Somali piracy
on the high seas. A coalition of navies has taken over the patrol of the sea
lanes, but in the absence of a state it is difficult to prosecute and punish the
captured pirates (Thompson, 2010). They are coming from the territory of
Puntland, which is one of the two polities within the former Somalia that
is most like a state. But the economic power of the pirates is now so great
that Puntland’s government would collapse if it attempted to try the pirates’
leaders (Samantar, 2010). Various bodies adopt quite ingenious methods to
get around these multinational constraints, but they are still constraints on
the ways in which Somalis themselves can define and construct their own
political authorities.
By now it is evident that Somalis are able to make social contracts, estab-
lish order and create political authorities. The international system wishes to
create a new state from the top down, following accepted international norms
and legal forms and imposing it onto the boundaries that preceded the col-
lapse of the Barre state. But state building among the Somalis is approached
from the bottom up, evolving in an organic and irregular manner and using
existing Somali social and religious institutions (Menkhaus, 2009).
Somalis have made social contracts to create political order in Somaliland,
Puntland and Belet Wein, as well as other localities. They grew out of the
clan system, required intensive and extensive local consensus building, us-
ing Somali conceptions of contract (xeer). The Somaliland and Puntland
political authorities have received a reasonable amount of attention
(Bradbury, 2008; Doornbos, 2002; Samantar, 2009), but the other local
efforts seem to have been documented only by Interpeace (previously
War-Torn Societies Project–WSP International) and best conceptualized as
a non-state ‘governance’ approach by Kenneth Menkhaus (Menkhaus, 2010;
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Menkhaus et al., 2010; also see, Bradbury, 2010; Bradbury and Healy, 2010;
Oker and Habibullah, 2010).
The results of the indigenous Somali efforts at establishing and main-
taining a social contract and political authority do not translate into even a
‘post box’ that resembles the old Somalia. They are irregular in territorial
coverage and political form, being built out of local negotiations; they do
not cover the whole of the territory of the old Somalia; and they couldn’t
readily be combined into something that could take Somalia’s place in the
international system. Some of them may even come to be Islamic in ways
that the US would oppose. But they are functioning and viable, and they
have the potential for further organic growth through negotiation.
Ironically the greatest threat to these variously-sized local attempts at
‘governance’ probably is the struggles over which entity is to capture the
‘post box’ designation for a Somalia state and all the international resources
(spoils?) that go with it. In our view the international attempt at ‘state build-
ing’ for Somalia, after nearly twenty years of abject failure, should be aban-
doned. In its place whatever individual entities have established effective
order and governance for themselves should be rewarded with international
development assistance. In order for the international community to get
around the conceptual trap of ‘stateness’ it has set for itself, the Transitional
Federal Government might be turned into a non-residential trust for the
Somali people and serve not as a state, but as a surrogate for the receipt and
onward transmission of aid to deserving governance structures (with strict
limits on the percentage of funds it can keep for ‘administration’). In this
way incentives will be created for other Somali communities and regions
to undertake the lengthy process of establishing viable governance systems
and peace for themselves, which will also enhance peace between these
entities (Menkhaus, 2010). Meanwhile the process of recreating a Somali
state, if it ever occurs, can be left to the same kinds of vagaries of history,
inter-unit competition and even warfare that characterized the processes of
state formation elsewhere in the world.
CONCLUSIONS: CREATING ORDER AND STATES
The Somali experience restructures much of what we thought we knew about
the absence of states. Statelessness does not automatically mean disorder.
Structured interactions (contracts and tit-for-tat balances of power) through
extended families (or localities), not anarchy, are an alternative to the state.
Consistent with the expectations of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant,
humans do use a contract to find order in the face of conflict. Nonetheless, in
conditions such as those prevailing among the Somalis, the social contract is
forged by groups, not by self-regarding individuals, and therefore imparts a
different kind of philosophical foundation than that provided for the Western
liberal state by the classical social contract theorists. This means that rights
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and representation will be conceived of first in group terms, rather than
individual ones, and this will make the achievement of rights for the latter
(as imagined in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights) more
difficult — in the Somali case particularly for women. This sacrifice (at least
temporarily) of individual to group rights would have disappointed Kant
(although probably not Rousseau) (Scruton, 2001: 118–20). But Kant would
have approved the more minimal, regulative conception of what a good
system of governance should be, one that permits a diversity of historically
contingent governance forms rather than imposing a UN-approved template
of the state (ibid.: 114–15). Among the Somalis intra-group governance
operates more by consensus than either hierarchy or democracy; but the
form would differ in other polities in Africa and elsewhere.
Nor is statelessness necessarily completely bad for business. Some eco-
nomic interests prosper in these conditions. The foundation for the livelihood
of the average Somali is pastoral livestock production. As we noted at the
outset, there are seven Somali polities (if we include the insurgent al Shabab)
and Somali herdsmen and traders constantly move across their boundaries
in search of pastures and markets. Sheep and goats move out of the Somali
region of Ethiopia through Djibouti, Bosasso in Puntland, and Berbera in
Somaliland to markets throughout the Middle East, as they always have.
Somali cattle from north-eastern Kenya and southern Somalia used to go
out of Mogadishu and Kismayu to these same Middle Eastern markets, but
the urban demand of Nairobi, Kenya is now such that they mostly move
there overland instead. In return duty-free products from Dubai, Oman,
etc. move back the other way through the same Somali ports and trade
routes.
Disorder is bad for fixed capital investments, but non-state forms of gov-
ernance may nonetheless be able to provide adequate security for many of
them, as is evidenced by the Somali mobile phone networks. A state could
be better for economic growth but, given the record of severe state predation
under Siad Barre, we must acknowledge that it also could be much worse.
Such a nuanced view is closer to Locke’s than to that of Hobbes.
Much of Somali herding and trade was never adequately governed by
states, even in the colonial era. Thus the fact that Somali clans, dia-paying
groups and Islamic sheria courts are maintaining some degree of order and
facilitating and enforcing contracts is not new. The role of these other insti-
tutions has expanded, however, and adapted to the much greater instability
that now plagues the Somali people. Traders sometimes now turn to sheria
courts in the Saudi peninsula to arbitrate their business disputes. And we
have seen that the great wealth of the traders who finance warlords in order
to gain control over key ports and the lesser wealth of the many success-
ful Somalis in the diaspora has shifted the formerly egalitarian dynamic of
sub-clan institutions into patron–client ones instead. It may surprise some
to see patron–client relations dominating politics even in non-state sys-
tems, but patronage really depends only on inequalities in the distribution of
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life-sustaining resources and the need of elites for some kind of support from
the less advantaged in return.
In some ways, the Somali polities with sea ports resemble the city-states
of the Italian renaissance, but their authority is more fragile and life in
them is sometimes more violent. These polities find it difficult to enforce
policies for the common good against the interests of individual members of
the economic elite. This made it very difficult for them to develop disease
control and inspection systems that give Somali livestock secure access to
Middle Eastern markets (Leonard, 2007) and ultimately they had to accept
the Saudi imposition of its own inspection regime.
In addition those elites who have built militias to fight one another to mo-
nopolize key resources — in Somalia most often the ports and the highways
that transport livestock to them. The violent conflict that ensues is largely be-
tween the contestants for these monopoly powers — not against citizens —
but the predation that is necessary to support these militias, and that follows
from the establishment of a monopoly, can be a substantial burden to any-
one who generates an income. The latter is exemplified by the cumulative
US$ 1,000 collected at roadblocks from each cattle truck on the road running
along the western border of Somalia to the northern ports. Thus, states do
have benefits to offer to the Somalis.
The longer statelessness persists, however, the stronger and more influ-
ential the interests that benefit from it become. Most producers and traders
would benefit from the kinds of peace a state could provide, but those inter-
ests wane in strength and influence as conflict endures and those activities
produce less income.
Under extreme stress the effectiveness even of kinship units of survival
will erode and be subject to the allied manipulations of the force of warlords
and the patronage of big businessmen. It then becomes more difficult to mo-
bilize either individual or kinship interests on behalf of state forms of social
order. We have argued here that the best way to counter the extractions of
patronage politics and of those who benefit from war is to provide the re-
wards of access to international development assistance to those governance
entities that are effective and sustain order, no matter how small and out of
conformity to strict international norms they are. We suggest that this would
be facilitated by reforming the TFG into a kind of non-residential trust for
the Somali people, through which aid to non-state governance entities could
be funnelled.
Otherwise, when the politics of greed is no longer tolerable and the
limits of the politics of kinship become evident, society is fertile soil for
the implantation of ideologies that can promise civil order. In the case of
Somaliland, those ideologies were a new nationalist identification with the
polity forged under British colonialism, followed by democracy. For the
southern part of the former Democratic Republic of Somalia, purely local
clan-based governance systems have instead been the path to order. In that
region the only other ideology that so far has proved able to rise above
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narrow sub-clan loyalties is Islam and its sheria courts. In the modern world
it is hard to imagine any forces other than kinship, nationalism or religion
out of which governance could be indigenously forged in the short term.
Only the last two of this trilogy would produce a state for the Somalis and
territorial nationalism carries little force outside the two northern Somali
polities. The real choices then are local governance through kinship or an
Islamist state.
In the twenty-first century it is very difficult for any external actor to
mobilize either nationalism or religion in order to create a state where it
has ceased to exist empirically. The collective power of international actors
seems a tempting alternative, but it is naı̈ve to assume that the various na-
tional and multinational interests of the actors who would be involved are
all either consistent with one another or congenial to a domestically viable
state-building project. If one accepts a more gradual creation of political
order and a more organic and unsystematic growth in size, however, in-
digenous forms of governance that pre-exist, parallel or compete with state
suzerainty offer a viable path. They may very well not conform to Western
ideas of the liberal state (although the lack of democracy would not have
troubled Hobbes, and Rousseau would have liked the ‘general will’ that
emerges from clan deliberations). But such a liberal state can grow out of
state collapse only if it has indigenous roots and the ‘best’ should not be
allowed to foreclose a ‘satisfactory’ peace.
Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 the international system has been
based on states, which recognize one another and are presumed to control
and be able to act on behalf of the territories they nominally occupy. This
foundation for international relations does not fit the reality of ‘collapsed
states’ and is a barrier to the reconstruction of political order within them
by alternative governance systems. Somehow the international system has
to find a way, on the one hand, to give empirical (if not juridical) standing to
non-state political authorities, learning how to deal with them effectively and
supportively, and, on the other hand, to empower international surrogates that
can act as trustees for the interests of the ‘citizens’ of the non-existent states.
In reaching these conclusions, we have perused the great modern social
contract theorists. We do not suggest that one was more ‘right’ than the
others. Instead we have sought to show that each of these men made as-
sumptions about the social contract (albeit different ones) that fit poorly
with the realities of the Somalis. The treatment of their thinking here eluci-
dates the weighty conceptual baggage that those trained in the West bring
to the Somali crisis and the need for the international system to be ready
to reconceptualize the social contract for a different people and a different
age.
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